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THE ABUSER PAYS:
THE CONTROL OF UNWARRANTED DISCOVERY
JOHN HEAPS* & KATHRYN TAYLOR**

This paper looks at the crisis in the English civil justice system, with
particular regard to the problems associated with discovery. It supports
an English lawyer's contribution to a debate held in Washington, D.C.,
in September 1996, entitled Modem Discovery Practice:Searchfor Truth
or Means of Abuse?' Highlighting the key differences in discovery
procedure between England and the United States and the contemporary
problems in the discovery process in England, it looks at the proposals for
reform made in July 1996 as a result of the Review of Civil Justice by
Lord Woolf ("the Woolf Inquiry").2 The authors argue that the question
of discovery abuse is inextricably linked to the question of costs. By
recognizing and using the potential which sophisticated costs orders have
for influencing the conduct of litigants, courts in both England and the
U.S. can make substantial in-roads to curbing discovery abuse.
I. INTRODUCTION

The current debate about civil justice taking place in many common
law systems is founded on the principle that a system of civil justice is
essential to the maintenance of a civilized society. In the words of an
eminent English jurist, a civil justice system "manifests the political will
* Partner, Eversheds (Leeds, England).
** Solicitor, Eversheds (Leeds, England).

1. Panel Two: Modern Discovery Practice:Searchfor Truth or Means of Abuse?,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 453, 467-74 (1997).
2. The Review of the Civil Justice System in England and Wales by The Right
Honorable the Lord Woolf. Lord Woolf (now Master of the Rolls) was appointed by the
Lord Chancellor on March 28, 1994, to review the current rules and procedures of the
civil courts in England and \Vales. The aims of the review were (1) to improve access
to justice and reduce the costs of litigations; (2) to reduce the complexity of the rules and
modernize technology; and (3) to remove unnecessary distinctions of practice and
procedure. Two reports, both entitled Access to Justice were published along with Draft
Civil ProceedingsRules. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO
THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES
(1995) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; LoRD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND &

WALES (1996) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: DRAFT
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS RULES (1996) [hereinafter DRAFT RULES]. It is expected that the
rules will be finalized in 1997, and it is likely that they will be implemented in 1998,
although this depends on Parliamentary time being made available.
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of the State that civil remedies be provided for civil rights and claims, and
that civil wrongs, whether they consist of infringements of private rights
in the enjoyment of life, liberty, property or otherwise, be made good, so
far as practicable, by compensation and satisfaction, or restrained, if
necessary, by appropriate relief. It responds to the social need to give full
and effective value to the substantive rights of members of society which
would otherwise be diminished or denuded of worth or even reality." 3
If an effective system of justice is essential to the maintenance of a
civilized society, then English society is threatened. For the last two
years, its civil justice system has been subject to scrutiny at the highest
level. The Woolf Inquiry confirmed what many had suspected for some
time: the civil justice system is creaking-it is in a critical state-and this
is threatening the rights of individuals, businesses, and the British
economy. "The key problems facing civil justice today are cost, delay
These three are interrelated and stem from the
and complexity.
uncontrolled nature of the litigation process." 4 Indeed, the costs of
litigation in England are now so high that
[e]xcessive cost[s] deter people from making or defending claims.
A number of businesses [say] that it is often cheaper to pay up,
irrespective of the merits, than to defend an action. For
individual litigants the unaffordable cost of litigation constitutes
a denial of access to justice ...
S.. T]he diversion of executives and other employees from
their normal activities . . . can have serious implications for
[large corporations'] profitability.'
One leading international bank has considered changing the venue for
resolving its legal disputes from London to New York. 6 Another
international firm of civil engineers told the Woolf Inquiry that
[t]he risk of litigation and the costs of such litigation is higher in
the UK (Scotland is an exception) than in any other country in
which we operate in the world, except, possibly, the state of
California. The cost of defending UK litigation, paid by our
3. SIR JACK I.H. JACOB, THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (1982) (citation omitted).

4. INTERIM

REPORT,

5. Id.at 9.
6. See id.at 12.

supra note 2, at 7.
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professional indemnity insurers, now exceeds our annual budget
for training and development.'
United States lawyers may take some comfort in knowing that England
also faces an acute litigation crisis. Some of the problems, and indeed
solutions such as case management proposed by Lord Woolf, will sound
familiar to U.S. lawyers. Others, such as the modification of the English
rule on costs, may be surprising. In any event, as England draws in part
on U.S. solutions such as case management, perhaps the U.S. will borrow
something in return. In this way, civil justice and the societies it serves on
either side of the Atlantic might benefit.
The Woolf Inquiry is wide-ranging. In its final form, excluding the
draft Rules, it runs to 370 pages and contains 303 separate
recommendations. Before examining those which most closely relate to
the curbing of the substantial problems associated with discovery, it may
be helpful to look at the existing system, in order to highlight the
differences between the respective systems for the administration of justice
in England and Wales, and the U.S. The exchange of ideas without the
benefit of a basic understanding of these differences would be wasteful.
II. Two COMMON LAW

SYSTEMS DIVIDED

BY...

The key differences between civil litigation in the U.S. and in England
can be summarized by the following list:
* access to justice;
" costs;
• contingency fees;
" juries;
* punitive damages;
• class actions/mass torts; and
" discovery.
Each demands close examination.

7. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
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A. Access To Justice
The number of civil cases filed each year in England and Wales is
falling.' There may be a number of reasons for this, but as society
becomes more complex, and its population increases, it seems specious to
suppose that the number of disputes between its members actually
declines. It is hard to believe that the disproportionate costs of litigation,
increasingly out of reach of more citizens, does not have a prohibitive
effect on the issue of proceedings.
B. Costs
Although the decision as to who will bear the costs of an action are
entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, a general principle almost
invariably followed by English judges is that costs follow the
event-known as the English Rule.' This means that the losing party will
be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, as well as his own
legal costs.' ° In fact, after costs have been taxed, the successful party
will recover between one-half and two-thirds of the fees he actually pays
to his lawyers. He may have won, but not without some cost to himself.
Moreover, until the conclusion of the case and often not before the
successful party's solicitor has had his costs "taxed" (approved by the
court), the unfortunate party who has to bear all those costs will have no
accurate idea of what the final bill may be.
This system of "costs transfer" according to the outcome of the case
is not without fault. It raises the stakes in litigation: once on the litigation
treadmill, a party will reach a point where he can ill-afford not to spend
whatever it takes to avoid losing and thus picking up two sets of legal
fees. Thus, the litigant will use his lawyers to apply a sledge hammer to
the cracking of a nut. The English rule is more frequently an incitement
to indulge in excessive and disproportionate behavior than it is a deterrent.
8. In 1991, 3.7 million claims were entered in the county courts.

See LORD

CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, JUDICIAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES FOR THE YEAR

1992 39 tbl.4.1 [hereinafter 1992 JUDICIAL STATISTICS]. This fell to 2.4 million in 1995.

See LORD CHANCELLOR'S

DEP'T, JUDICIAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND VALES FOR THE

YEAR 1995 37 tbl.4.1 [hereinafter 1995 JUDICIAL STATISTICS]. In the Queens Bench
Division, the number of writs and originating summonses reached a high of a little over
360,000 in 1991, falling to just below 154,000 in 1995. See 1992 JUDICIAL STATISTICS,
supra, at 29 tbl.3.1; 1995 JUDICIAL STATISTICS, supra, at 27 tbl.3.1 (1995).
9. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 79. See generally Edward A. Snyder &
James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990).
10. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 9, at 345.
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Furthermore, the English loser-pays rule is relatively blunt and
unwieldy. It takes no account of the conduct of the parties during the
course of the litigation. It means that rarely, if ever, is the question of the
costs involved in each individual step in the litigation process ever brought
into focus. Courts, and therefore parties, lump all costs together and look
at them globally only at the end of the litigation. "
In addition, the rule inhibits both the initiation and the defense of
proceedings: a prospective litigant may do his calculations and conclude
that he cannot afford, whether as plaintiff or defendant, to board the
litigation ship in the first place, because of the added risk he assumes in
having to meet two sets of legal fees in the event of losing.
Pressure is building in some quarters for the U.S. to adopt the
"English Rule," but resistance is intense, and rightly so. The prospect of
"loser pays all" calls into question the availability of justice. As one
member of both the English and California bars has noted, Americans are
concerned "that when the law ceases to be available for use by the public
at large, this is the first sign of its decay." 2 On this test, English law
is already in real jeopardy. As this paper attempts to argue, the use of
costs orders could provide a cure to the decay and a prevention for
excessive behavior, including abusive discovery demands. However, a
significant improvement is likely only if the courts are prepared to be
more flexible and imaginative when using costs orders than the current
English Rule permits.
C. Contingency Fees
Although contingency fees are well established in the U.S. for
personal injury cases and increasingly common in commercial cases,
English lawyers were prohibited from charging on such a basis until very
recently. 3 Change has now come, but only in a very limited range of
11.
12.
13.
grounds

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-79.
Keith Evans, COM. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 59.
Contingency fees, in relation to contentious business, are unlawful on the
of public policy:

It was suggested ...

that the only reason why 'contingency fees' were not

allowed in England was because they offended against the criminal law as to
champerty; and that, now that criminal liability is abolished, the courts were
free to hold that contingency fees were lawful. I cannot accept this contention.
The reason why contingency fees are in general unlawful is that they are
contrary to public policy as we understand it in England.
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse, 3 All E.R. 721, 741-42 (Q.B. 1979). Not only
were agreements as to contingency fees unenforceable, but a solicitor entering into such
an agreement would breach Law Society Rules and thus run the risk of disciplinary
proceedings. See Peter F. Schlosser, Speech, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems
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Most significantly, such fee arrangements can be used in

relation to personal injury litigation.' 5

Termed "conditional fee

agreements" they are puny compared to their transatlantic elder brother,
ordinarily providing merely for a "success uplift" payable in the event of
winning on agreed fees which would be payable in any event. 6 It has
been said that more than fifty percent of the British public have no real
access to the civil courts. 7 Generally, the public is too affluent to
qualify for Legal Aid, and not affluent enough to pay lawyers themselves,
and therefore they are caught in a legal poverty trap. Perhaps this is why
the number of actions commenced each year is falling. In America, the
civil law is seen as accessible by all-a laudable principle, and one very
much endorsed by the Woolf Report.' It is a principle which is given
real meaning by the contingency fee principle. However, whether
conditional fee agreements will contribute greatly to increasing access to
the courts is doubtful: use of the "success uplift" means most clients are
still required to find and to pay what may be a substantial sum, win or
lose.

and American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. RV.9, 18 (1996).
14. See Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, ch. 41, § 58 (Eng.). The classes of
litigation in which conditional fee agreements can be used are set out in the Conditional
Fee Agreements Order, 1995, S.I. 1995, No. 1674 (Eng.). They are limited to personal
injury, human rights cases, winding up, and administration orders and proceedings by
a liquidator, administrator or trustee in bankruptcy. See id. There was considerable
pressure on the Lord Chancellor's Department that was responsible for drafting the
secondary legislation to include debt recovery work but this was resisted. Lobbying on
behalf of the profession and clients continues in an effort to extend the scope of
conditional fee agreements to cover debt recovery.
15. See Conditional Fee Agreements Order, 1995, S.I. 1995, No. 1674 (Eng.).
16. The maximum fee increase is 100% of agreed fees, which are payable in any
event. See id.
17. See Cyril Glasser, Solving the Litigation Crisis, LITIGATOR, 1994, at 14, 14-15.
Civil Litigation is in a state of crisis .... While criticism of the cost of
legal services and delays in the court process are hardly new they have
recently taken on a renewed urgency.
The combination of increases in the cost of legal services and the lack of
effective access to the courts for the vast majority of its citizens has created a
crisis for the government, the judiciary and the profession.
Id. at 14, 17.
18. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 ("[A] particular concern has been to
improve access to justice for individuals and small businesses.").
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D. Juries

In England, the role of juries has, for many years, been limited to the
finding of fact in criminal trials. The only type of civil litigation in which
they are cast as a player is in defamation cases, otherwise, the use of
juries is almost unheard of in any form of civil litigation. Even in those
cases, their use has been subject to substantial criticism, 9 because they
Those
have retained the power to award very substantial damages.'
damages look remarkably like punitive damages, or, as they are generally
referred to in England, "exemplary damages."
E. Punitive Damages
Except for in a very limited number of circumstances, exemplary or
punitive damages are not available in England. 2'

19. See Marcus A. Brown, Commentary, Trial by Jury-An Obsolete Concept, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 109, 112 (1995).
20. In spite of calls for reform of the use of juries in defamation trials, the
Defamation Act of 1996 does not address the principal problem of juries making erratic
and often very large awards of damages. See Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31 (Eng.). The
Act contains no specific provisions to limit awards of damages. See id. However, a
provision is made for the defendant to "offer to make amends," by way of correction
and/or compensation. Id. § 2. Whether or not such an offer is made, and the suitability
and sufficiency of such, is a matter which the court can take into account and may reduce
or increase the amount of compensation accordingly.
21. Exemplary damages are only exceptionally permitted, for example, in cases of
express statutory authority, oppressivebehavior by government servants, or objectionable
conduct calculated to result in profit. "Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for
a plaintiffs rights has calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will
probably exceed the damages at risk, it is necessary for the law to show that it cannot
be broken with impunity." Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] App. Cas. 1129, 1227 (1963).
In Rookes, the House of Lords reviewed the opportunity to review the doctrine of
exemplary damages. Such damages first made their appearance in England in the mideighteenth century. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v.
Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763). They became a regular feature of tort actions,
but never of contract actions. The House of Lords took the opportunity in Rookes to
"remove an anomaly from the law of England" from most cases. Rookes, [1964] App.
Cas. at 1221. The principal argument against punitive damages is that, confusing the
civil and criminal functions of the law, they are anomalous in the civil sphere. It has
been argued that to allow them "contravenes every protection which has been evolved
for the protection of offenders." Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] App. Cas. 1027,
1087 C-F.
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F. Class Actions/Mas Torts
The English courts have no specific procedures for the conduct of
complex class actions. However, the judges claim a broad power enabling
the courts to be "as flexible and adaptable as possible in the application of
existing procedures with a view to reaching decisions quickly and
economically."' As a result of major disasters such as the Kings Cross
station fire and product liability problems, the courts have had to deal with
increasing numbers of class actions. The infancy of this type of action
makes it a novelty, albeit less so with the passage of time.
G. Discovery
Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery in
federal cases, English procedural rules of discovery cannot be modified
nor ignored by local courts. In England, two sets of court rules apply:
County Court Rules to all smaller, less complicated matters proceeding in
county courts; and the Rules of the Supreme Court for more complex
issues pending in the High Court and higher appeal courts. There is
substantial similarity in these rules, and there is no need to distinguish
between the two for current purposes.
Although in England the term "discovery" means the disclosure of
documents only, and in this sense has a much more restrictive meaning
than it has in the U.S., English and American lawyers share several tools
for discovering the facts relevant to a matter. For instance, disclosure and
production of documents, interrogatories, and notices to admit/requests for
admissions are all tools used in England to get at the facts of a case.
Depositions are known to English civil litigation, but are of such limited
application that they are hardly used at all.23 In an effort to limit "trial
by ambush," which is the evil to which all discovery weapons were
originally directed, the use of witness statements was introduced in
1986.24 These statements which are prepared by a party's own lawyers,
and now exchanged with the other party before trial, stand as evidence-inchief.
For fear that courts will allow neither amendment nor
supplementation after exchange, a great deal of "lawyering" goes into
22. Davies v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1 W.L.R. 1136, 1139E (C.A. 1987).
23. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.39, r.1 (Eng.). The court can order examination on oath
when necessary for the purposes ofjustice. See id. The provision is used for witnesses
who will be unable to attend trial or when evidence is sought abroad. See id.
24. See Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 2), S.I. 1986, No. 1187 6
(Eng.). The Rules of the Supreme Court were amended by Rules of the Supreme Court
(Amendment No. 2), S.I. 1986, No. 1187, and subsequently amended by S.I. 1988, No.
1340, and S.I. 1992, No. 1907 to provide for the exchange of statements.
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their preparation. The end product rarely bears much resemblance to the
witness's own words. What was an attempt to reduce trial costs has
resulted in the front loading of costs to a ridiculous degree in cases which
are often settled before trial.
Although the tools of discovery may be similar, the scope and
application of those tools is considerably wider in the U.S. than in
England. For litigants in England, the very existence and extent of a right
of discovery currently depends against whom it is sought: a party, a
prospective party or a stranger/third party.
1. The Right to Discovery of Documents and Facts
(i) Automatic discovery requires discovery of documents between the
parties, without requests, once pleadings are closed.' It is worth noting
that although amendments to pleadings are permitted, the consent of court
is needed for all but the first amendment. 6 However, frequent and very
late amendments are all too common.
(ii) Pre-action discovery of documents is available with the consent of the
court, but only in cases of death and personal injury,' and even then,
only when the documents to be produced are necessary and described with
care and precision. The result is that the use of pre-action discovery as
a means of undertaking a fishing expedition is limited. Lawyers rarely
resort to pre-action discovery.
(iii) Discovery of facts by interrogatories is available only against parties
with which there is a matter in question;' s interrogatories can be
administered without leave of the court. They must relate to "any matter
in question between [the parties] in the cause or matter which are
necessary either (a) for disposing fairly of the cause or matter, or (b) for
saving costs."29 Interrogatories are not allowed where their object is to
obtain an admission of fact which can be proven at trial by the attendance
of a witness who will in any case be called at trial. They are also not
allowed if designed to prove a cause of action or defense not yet pleaded
or to establish an action against a third party.

25. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.24, r.1.
26. See id. 0.20, rr.1 & 3.
27. See id. 0.24, r.7A; Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 33(2) (Eng.).
28. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.26, r.1.

29. Id. 0.26, r.1.
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(iv) Discovery of documents or facts against a stranger is available in
very limited circumstances, such as in personal injury actions against the
treating hospital, as opposed to the defendant Health Authority, and in tort
cases where the third party has provided facilities for the commission of
the wrong but is not personally liable. If documents are required from a
third party, it is necessary to issue a subpoena duces tecumrf and require
attendance at trial, or at a nominal trial date set in advance of the actual
trial date.
(v) Oddly enough, inspection, preservation, testing and sale of property
are available both before and after commencement of proceedings and
against both parties and strangers. 3'
(vi) There is no duty to disclose the identity of individuals likely to have
discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged in the
pleadings.
2. The Obligation of Discovery of Documents
a. An On-Going Obligation
The obligation to give automatic discovery of documents 32 is ongoing
throughout the litigation process. It requires the production of documents
which are relevant, regardless of when they come into the possession,
custody or power of the party under the obligation. 3 This can mean that
in an action which includes a claim for prospective loss of earnings, the
plaintiff is under an obligation to tell his opponent if and when he obtains
a lucrative contract of employment at any time up to and including trial.

30. See id. 0.38, rr.14-19.
31. See id. 0.29, rr.2-7A.
32. "The meaning of 'documents' is not restricted to paper writing, but extends to
anything upon which evidence or information is recorded in a manner intelligible to the
senses or capable of being made intelligible by the use of equipment. Thus tape
recordings of evidence or information are documents." Id. 0.24, r.1 (annotation
24/1/5).
33. This principle contained in R.S.C. 0.24 is linked to the principle in R.S.C.,

1995, 0.18, rr.8 & 9, requiring a party to not seek to take his opponent by surprise or,
in failing to disclose relevant documents, mislead the Court or his opponent into
believing that full discovery has been given. See id. 0.24, r.1 (annotation 4/1/2); id.
0.18, rr.8, 9.
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b. An Obligation On Whom?
The principle obligation to disclose relevant documents is on the party
to the litigation. Failure to honor this obligation can result in the party's
pleading being dismissed or struck out, and even in the party being
committed for contemptY4 However, his solicitor is under an onerous
duty to ensure this occurs. Very early in the litigation process, clients
must be advised of the duty and its breadth. They must be told of the
importance of not destroying or tampering with material which might
possibly be disclosable35 and of the need to take positive steps to ensure
that the material is preserved. 6 There is a duty to notify the court and
in some circumstances to withdraw from acting in cases where a client
fails to comply with proper advice as to discovery. 37 "It cannot be too
clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the
court, carefully to go through the documents disclosed by their clients to
make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been
omitted from their clients' [discovery]." 3" Failure to comply with this
duty can render the solicitor subject to disciplinary proceedings or to
committal.39
c. An Obligation To Disclose What?
A party to an action must' disclose all documents which are in his
possession, custody or power and which "relate to matters in question in
the action."41 This goes to the questions in the action and not to the
34.
35.
E.R. 98
36.

See id. 0.24, r.16.
See Rockwell Machine Tool Co. v. E.P. Barrus (Concessionaires) Ltd., 2 All
(Ch. 1968).
Infabrics Ltd. v. Jaytex Ltd., 12 F.S.R. 75, 79 (Ch. 1985) (stating "[it is not

enough simply to give instructions").
37. See Myers v. Elman, [1940] App. Cas. 282, 293-94, 300-01 & 322-23 (1939).
38. Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd., 1 Q.B. 55, 60 (1959) (emphasis added).
39. See Myers, [1940] App. Cas. at 300; R.S.C., 1995, 0.24, r.16.

40. This requirement applies automatically, unless the parties have agreed between
themselves, or an application has been made to court and an order made, to limit or
dispense with discovery. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.24, r.1.
41. R.S.C., 1995, 0.24, rr.1-3 & 7 use slightly different terminology when
referring to what material must relate for it to be discoverable. Thus, rule 1 (mutual
discovery of documents) says "relating to matters in question in the action"; rule 2
(automatic discovery without court order) says "relating to any matter in question

between them in the action"; rule 3 (court order for discovery) says "relating to any
matter in question in the cause or matter"; and rule 7 (specific discovery) says "relates
to one or more of the matters in question in the cause or matter." Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

subject matter of the action. However, the net is wider than might first
be supposed.
Currently, four categories of document must be
disclosed:42 (1) the parties' own documents upon which they rely; (2)
adverse documents of which a party is aware and which materially affect
his own case or support another party's case; (3) other background
documents, which are relevant, yet are not necessary for the fair disposal
of the case; and (4) train of inquiry documents, which may lead to a train
of inquiry enabling a party to advance his own case or damage his
opponent's, of the type referred to in Compagnie Financiere et
Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co.43
On this test, the range of potentially relevant and thus discoverable
documents is almost unlimited. The disclosing party has to review and list
all such documents, while the other party has to read them. In all
probability, only a very small number of those documents will ever be
used in court to affect the outcome of the case. However, the test
facilitates oppressive behavior. Many of the real and perceived problems
of excessive discovery in English actions stem from this broad definition
of what is discoverable, and in particular, the inclusion of documents
which are indirectly relevant.
III. ABUSES OF DISCOVERY IN ENGLAND
By tradition the conduct of civil litigation in England and
Wales, as in other common law jurisdictions, is adversarial....
[T]he main responsibility for the initiation and conduct of
proceedings rests with the parties. . . . The role of the judge is
to adjudicate on issues selected by the parties when they choose
to present them to the court.
Without effective judicial control, however, the adversarial
process is likely to encourage an adversarial culture and to
42. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 124.
43. 11 Q.B.D. 55, 63 (1882). The current test for relevance was established in
Compagnie Financiere. It requires discovery of
every document... which not only would be evidence upon any issue, but

also which, it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may-not
which must-either directly or indirectly enable the party [applying for
discovery] either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his
adversary. . . . [A] document can properly be said to contain information
which may enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own
case or to damage the case of his adversary, if it is a document which may
fairly lead him to a train of inquiry, which may have [one] of

. .

. two

consequences."
Id. at 63. Note that this test does not limit the discoverable material to that which is
admissible into evidence. See id. at 62.
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degenerate into an environment in which the litigation process is
too often seen as a battlefield where no rules apply.
. . . There is no effective control of [the parties'] worst
excesses. Indeed, the complexity of the present rules facilitates
the use of adversarial tactics ....
. . . [T]he rules are flouted on a vast scale.
• . . [T]he main procedural tools for conducting litigation
efficiently have each become subverted from their proper
purpose. 44
The Interim Report lists, very succinctly, the major ills in England's
civil procedure, for example:
[Pileadingsoften fail to state the facts as the rules require. This
leads to . . . the failure to establish the issues in the case at a
reasonably early stage ....
Witness statements, a sensible innovation aimed at a "cards
on the table" approach, have in a very short time begun to follow
the same route as pleadings, with the draftsman's skill often used
to obscure the original words of the witness.
The scale of discovery, at least in the larger cases, is
completely out of control. The principle of full, candid disclosure
in the interests of justice has been devalued because discovery is
pursued without sufficient regard to economy and efficiency in
terms of the usefulness of the information which is likely to be
obtained from the documents disclosed.
. . . [I]nstead of the expert [witness] assisting the court to
resolve technical problems, delay is caused by the unreasonable
insistence on going to unduly eminent members of the profession
and evidence is undermined by the partisan pressure to which
party experts are subjected.
In the majority of cases the reasons for delay arise from a
failure to progress the case efficiently, wasting time on peripheral
issues or procedural skirmishing to wear down an opponent ...
Excessive discovery and the use of experts in heavy demand both
contribute to [this] delay.45
The critical condition of the system is such that Lord Woolf believes

44.

supra note 2, at 7-8.
45. Id. at 8, 13 (emphasis added).
INTERIM REPORT,
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there is now no alternative to a fundamental shift in the
responsibility for the management of civil litigation from litigants
and their legal advisers to the courts ...
A change of this nature will involve not only a change in the
way cases are progressed within the system. It will require a
radical change of culture for all concerned.' 6
With increased responsibility for management of cases, there will have
to be an increased readiness to apply costs orders much more flexibly.
The "automatic exercise of discretion" in favour of the successful litigant,
regardless of his conduct throughout the litigation process, will have to
cease. Judges will have to be more discriminating when applying costs
orders so as to encourage a responsible and proportionate approach to
litigation and to punish excessive and oppressive conduct aimed at wearing
down an opponent.
Thus, if Lord Woolf's recommendations are
implemented, a discussion of which follows, "the landscape of civil
litigation will be fundamentally different." 4'

VI. THE WOOLF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The bedrock on which all the reforms are set is that the civil justice
system should enable the courts to deal with cases justly, according to the

principles of:

" equality between the parties;

" economy in the use of resources;
" proportionality with regard to the amount at stake, importance of
the case, complexity of issues and the parties' financial position;
o expedition; and
* the need to allocate court resources to other cases. 48
Rule 1 of the Draft Civil Proceedings Rules imposes an obligation on
the courts and the parties to further the overriding objective of dealing
with cases justly, according to these principles.49
With the use of the principles, certain features will dominate:
litigation will be less adversarial and more cooperative, less complex and
more responsive to the needs of litigants, and the use of principles will
encourage parties to avoid litigation wherever possible. Parties will be
46. Id. at 18.
47. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
48. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, at 2.
49. See id.
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required to "put their cards on the table" early in disputes, often before
litigation is started.' Pleadings will be simplified and made to cast the
facts clearly and succinctly, so as to facilitate early definition of the
issues.
Responsibility for the management of cases will shift from the parties
to the courts." Although the adversarial system will remain, it will have
been denuded and eroded. Case management looms large in the new
landscape: it is central to Lord Woolf s recommendations and central to
controlling the expense of litigation.52 As discovery is often the largest
single cost factor in litigation, both in terms of legal expenses and the
diversion of management resources, exercising control over the process
will be central to successfully reducing both the apparent and hidden costs
of litigation.
Also, crucial to managing the new landscape is the control of costs
and the use of costs orders in a flexible and much more imaginative way
than has previously been known in England. Costs will be used more
directly and more often as a means not only of sanctioning parties, but of
influencing them in advance of a particular course of action. The new
regime will be supported by effective sanctions, including orders for costs
in a fixed sum payable immediately.

50. See id. at 186-97; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 112-15. For some time,
there has been a provision for defendants to make formal offers to settle before a matter
comes to trial. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.22, r.1 (regarding payments into court and
"Calderbank" letters, aimed at encouraging settlement). The rules are such that if the
offer is not accepted, and at judgment its terms are not bettered, then the plaintiff is
invariably penalized as to costs. Woolf proposes to make the rules more flexible. The
ability to make an offer to settle will be extended to the plaintiff. Offers need not await
the issue of proceedings: the rules will encourage either party to a dispute to make an
offer before proceedings have been issued. To encourage the acceptance of reasonable
offers, a party who fails to accept an offer which is not equalled or bettered at trial may
face an award of enhanced costs and interest being charged against him. Unreasonable
behavior will invite jeopardy. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, at 186-97.
51. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 207.
52. Woolf describes the introduction of judicial case management as a crucial
element of the new system. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. He has been
significantly influenced by developments in the U.S., New Zealand and Canada. See id.
The Commercial Court in England has used case management in, for example, the
Lloyd's litigation. See id. The regime which Woolf aims to introduce will be more
extensive than this and will affect all courts. See id.
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A. Pleadings:A New Breed
Currently, pleadings "are often misused and frequently fail to serve
their intended purpose." 5 3 Their basic function-to state succinctly the
facts relied upon-all too often disappears from view as parties obscure
issues and deliberately obfuscate their opponents. Original pleadings are
often superseded by amendments and further and better particulars.
Courts routinely fail to police pleadings so as to encourage brevity and
clarification of issues at an early stage. Consequently, as issues remain
ill-defined, the scope of discovery remains unbounded.
Woolf proposes to restore to primacy the basic function of
pleadings." Clear and concise statements of facts will enable both the
parties and the court to define the true issues at the heart of the dispute
early on, with little or no need for further exchanges in the form of
requests for further and better particulars, notices to admit, or
interrogatories. 6 To this end, both the "claimant" and the defendant will
be required to set out in a single document all the material matters on
which they rely, including facts, remedies sought and a list of documents
necessary to the case.
Parties will be encouraged to produce a provisional list of issues in the
matter and case conferences will be used to clarify factual allegations. If
possible, an agreed statement of issues in dispute will be produced at the
case management conference, which will supersede the pleadings. Should
further uncertainty about issues arise, perhaps out of discovery, parties
should cooperate and failing this, seek assistance from the court. Equally,
if a party is faced with a request which he considers vexatious, for
53. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 153.

54. See R.S.C., 1995, 0.18, r.7.
55. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 105, 118.
56. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 155-56.

57. Thus, the statement of claim will succinctly set out the nature of the claim, the
facts relied upon and the remedy sought. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, r.7.4, at 33.
It will also identify any document necessary to the plaintiff's case, and include a
certificate of belief in the truth of the contents of the statement, made by the claimant or
his legal representative. See id. r.7.6, at 35. Other optional matters may also be
included, such as a specification of any matter of law relied upon, the identity of any
witness he intends to call and short summary of the evidence such a witness will give.
See id. r.7.9, at 36. The defendant's statement must list the allegations admitted, denied
or doubted, accompanied by explanations for such dispute, and the defendant's own
version of events, if they are different from that of the claimant. See id. rr.8, 9.5, at 40,
44. The defendant must say why he disputes the claimant's alleged right to a remedy and
the claimant's assessment of value and damages. See id. r.9.5, at 44-45. It too must
contain a certificate of belief in the contents. See id. r.9.7, at 44.
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example an array of questions whose quantity suggests they are intended
merely to be burdensome, or a failure to respond to a reasonable request
for information, he can seek an order from the court dispensing with his
need to deal with it.58 In this way, issues will be clarified early in the
proceedings, which will enable the parties and the court to deal with the
matters, including discovery, expeditiously and with economically.
B. Case management
Case management include[s] identifying the issues in the case;
summarily disposing of some issues and deciding in which order
other issues are to be resolved; fixing timetables for the parties to
take particular steps in the case; and limiting disclosure and
expert evidence. These are all judicial functions. They are
extensions backvards in time of the role of the trial judge. 9
Cases will be allocated to one of the three tracks: small claims, fasttrack or multi track, depending on their value and complexity.'
"Procedural judges"6" will take over responsibility for the management
of cases. Case management conferences will be commonplace, where
issues and evidential matters will be dealt with, and schedules drawn up
for the efficient and proportionate management of cases.62

58. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 156-57.
59. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
60. Small claims procedures will cover claims below £3000; the fast track is
intended for claims within the monetary band of £3000 to £10,000, as well as nonmonetary claims such as injunctions or orders for specific performance; the multi-track
will be used for all other matters. See id. at 22; see also DRAFT RULES, supra note 2,
at 118-26. Cases can subsequently be transferred to a different track. See FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 34. One of the issues which the court will be bound to
consider on either occasion is the wishes of the parties. See id. at 33.
61. Of which Lord Woolf says: "the procedural judge is not a new type of judge.

It is a function, not a title." FINAL

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 94.

62. See id. at 59. There will not, however, be a single judge assigned to each case.
There will be no "single docket" system, which at least ensures maximum continuity.
Concerned that effecting this would be impossible without reducing flexibility in
deployment of judges, Woolf recommends that judges work in teams, perhaps with a
.procedural judge." See id. at 94.
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C. Discovery
1. Disclosure of documents
The bounds of discovery in each case should be made more readily
discernible by the early definition of issues. The general scope of
documentary discovery, both in terms of what may be sought and what
must be disclosed, will be curtailed by new rules.
Of the four categories of document that currently have to be disclosed,
only documents relied upon or those of which a party is aware and are
materially adverse will be automatically available under "standard
disclosure" in the future. Material which falls into the "background
story" and "train of inquiry" categories will have to be sought by court
order-by way of "extra" or "specific" disclosure. When considering
whether to make an order for specific disclosure, the court must decide
whether specific disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the
claim or to save costs.63 It must have regard (a) to the likely benefit of
specific disclosure; (b) to the likely cost of specific disclosure; and (c) to
whether the financial resources of the party against whom the order would
be made are likely to be sufficient to enable the party to comply with any
such order. 4 It is important to note that the obligation to make standard
disclosure will remain continuous during proceedings.'
2. Pre-Action Discovery
Woolf proposes to extend pre-action disclosure of documents by
prospective parties to all cases whereas it is currently available only in
personal injury and death actions. 6
However, it will not be
automatic-application will have to be made to the court.67 Even then,
it will be limited to specified documents which can be shown to be in the
hands of the respondent, who must likely be the defendant in prospective
proceedings.68 Furthermore, the applicant must show that the documents
sought are relevant to a potential claim.69 In determining this question,
the court will apply the same rigorous cost-benefit tests as in normal post63. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, r.27.14, at 143.
64. See id.
65. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, r.27.12, at 142.

66.
67.
68.
69.

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 127.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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issue applications for specific disclosure.7' As for pre-action discovery
against a stranger or third party, this will be available only in personal
injury and death-related claims. 1
3. Witness Statements
To deal with the "overlawyering" of witness statements engendered
by fear that witnesses will be permitted neither to depart from, nor
supplement, the text, Woolf proposes to allow reasonable flexibility in
amplifying witness statements.72 If this fails to restrain lawyers from
"gilding the lily" and "grossly overdone drafting," wasted costs orders are
likely and the lawyer will pay. It will be required that statements are in
the witness's own words, stated as such, and signed.'
4. Costs & Sanctions74
In his interim report, Lord Woolf referred to the problems faced by
the opponents of litigants funded by Legal Aid.75 In such cases, there is
a virtual inability of the successful but unassisted party to recover costs
from a legally aided party. The usual rules of "costs transfer," or costs
following the event, do not apply.76 However, he notes that greater
liability to costs orders could result in the Legal Aid Board being more
discriminating as to how its funds are used (for example, when there is an
offer of settlement).77 There is nothing to suppose that the principle of
greater exposure to costs orders leading to a more discriminating approach
in conducting litigation is applicable only to English legally aided persons.
The authors would suggest that it is universally applicable. After all, it
is merely a process to make litigants accept responsibility for their actions.
But this basic social requirement seems to have been lost somewhere in
70. See id.
71. See id. at 128.

72. See id. at 129.
73. See id. at 130. With the Civil Evidence Act of 1995 coming into effect on
January 31, 1997, hearsay evidence has become admissible, and thus witness statements
are able to refer to matters not within the direct knowledge or observation of a witness.

However, the source of knowledge, information or belief upon which the witness relies
should be identified.
74. See id. at 72-90; DRAFT RULES, supra note 2, r.5.2, at 19.
75. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 205.
76. See id. There is a very limited power to make a costs order against a legally
aided litigant. See Legal Aid Act, 1988, § 17 (Eng.).
77. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 205.
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the development of the English civil justice system. In administering civil
justice, the English courts have largely chosen to ignore this simple
principle. Wrapped up in obtaining the correct legal answer and providing
a remedy for legal wrongs, the courts have ignored procedural
irresponsibility encountered along the way, and injustice and unfairness
has been allowed to take root.
It is time that this oversight was remedied, and it is hoped that the
Woolf reforms will facilitate this. The recommendations are certainly
intended to:
Costs are also of great importance to my Inquiry because the
ability of the court to make orders as to costs is the most
significant and regularly used sanction available. The court's
power to make appropriate orders as to costs can deter litigants
from behaving improperly or unreasonably and encourages them
to behave responsibly. Cost orders can also have a salutary effect
on members of the legal profession.
.. Costs are central to the changes I wish to bring about.78
Ironically, although Woolf sees costs as "the most serious problem
besetting our litigation system, ""7 he also sees costs as central to solving
its problems: they afford a means of controlling the excesses of parties
battling in an adversarial system. To this end, Lord Woolf recommends
a departure from the dual concepts to which English courts are wedded:
that costs should be treated as a whole and should follow the event.'
Instead, attention should be paid to the manner in which the successful
party has conducted the proceedings and the outcome of individual issues.
Attention should be given to identifying areas where costs have been
incurred unnecessarily and to excess. 8' Judges must be prepared to
scrutinize the parties' conduct, adopt greater flexibility and make more
detailed orders than they are currently accustomed to do.' In short, they
must abandon the clumsy, blunt instrument of the old rules, and take up
a much finer, sharper and incisive tool-a tool which parties cannot
ignore, which they will respect as having an immediate effect upon their
pockets.
78.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 2, at 78.

79. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 199.
80. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 79 (this is otherwise commonly referred
to as the English Rule).

81. SeeMi.
82. See id. at 83-84.
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As of yet, Draft Rules on costs have not been published. However,
what is clear from the approach taken in the Final Report, is that judges
will be afforded the widest possible discretion as to costs in order to
encourage the conduct of litigation in a proportionate manner and to
discourage excess. Where one of the parties is unable to afford a
particular procedure, the court, if it decides that the procedure is to be
followed, should be entitled to make its order conditional upon the other
side meeting the difference in the costs of the weaker party, whatever the
outcome. "The court should be able to order payment of interim costs in
cases where the opponent has substantially greater resources and where
there is a reasonable likelihood that the weaker party will be entitled to
costs at the end of the case."' "The court may make a wasted costs
order; it may assess costs or direct them to be taxed and may order them
to be paid immediately; [or it might] order interim costs of an amount
fixed by the court to be paid within a specified time."s"
V. CONCLUSION

In a speech delivered between the publication of the Interim Report
and this Final Report, Lord Woolf said:
In a situation where a streamline procedure is possible but that
procedure is only acceptable to one side and the other side has
good reason for recommending a more complex process, then the
court should be able to direct the complex procedure on condition
that the more powerful litigant pays the additional costs of both
sides in any event. In this way the litigant with limited means will
not be exposed to excessive costs which he cannot afford and the
other party will have every incentive to keep the costs as low as
possible.8
The reference to the "powerful litigant" and "the litigant of limited
means" must be read in the light of one of the major problems in English
civil courts: the powerful corporation using its greater resources to
overwhelm the "small man," the individual litigant of much smaller
means. It is the U.S. problem turned on its head, and it exists because
most people in England do not have recourse to funding for litigation.
The average English citizen does not have access to private capital or
public subsidy to fund his fight. He has nothing approaching the credit
83. Id. at 89.
84. DRAFT RULEs, supra note 2, r.5.2, at 19 (emphasis added).
85. Lord Woolf, The Child & Co. Lecture: The Future of Civil Justice 8 (Feb. 19,

1996) (emphasis added) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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provided for litigation by lawyers working on a contingency fee basis.
With no funds, he is weak in the face of the corporation whose resources
are undoubtedly greater and legal expenses tax deductible. The English
problem is the abuse of power-that is the exercise of power without
corresponding responsibility-by the "big guns."
The exercise of power with responsibility can be encouraged, and
irresponsibility sanctioned, by attaching a price to the exercise of power.
If the litigant with more muscle wants to seek more extensive discovery
than seems warranted, then he should be allowed to do so on condition
that he pays for the privilege at the time he puts his opponent to the
trouble. If it transpires that the exercise was justified, then the costs order
can be reversed. In this way, the parties' autonomy remains intact while
judges cannot be accused of unfairly limiting a party's investigations on
a superficial understanding of the case. With the right to litigate comes
a responsibility for the manner in which the litigation is conducted. The
effective use of costs orders, applied judiciously and early enough, should
act as a brake on the activities of the more powerful litigant. Having to
pay will generate a pause for thought, for reflection and evaluation of
whether the steps proposed are necessary and consistent with the just,
expeditious, economical and proportionate disposal of the case. By doing
so, the problems associated with automatic costs transfer-the
encouragement of disproportionate and abusive behavior and the inhibition
of participation in the legal process-might be avoided.
The distribution of power between respective types of litigants may be
different in the U.S., but the same principles can be used to control abuse
of that power: it does not matter in whose hands it rests. The systems of
civil justice in the U.S. and in England have much in common. There are
differences, from which lessons can be learned on either side of the
Atlantic.
As England learns from the U.S. and borrows case
management, perhaps in return a recommendation might be ventured. The
English Rule on costs transfer is not to be commended. Its very rigidity
encourages abuse and discourages citizens and corporations from
exercising and protecting their rights. A system of costs transfer which
takes account of the outcome of individual issues in a case and the conduct
of the parties during the litigation process has much more to be said for
it as a tool for serving justice.

